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Minorities and Honest Opinion 
Freedom of expression, and freedom of individual reputation, are rights that have been at 
loggerheads since time immemorial. While a discussion regarding the correct balance of 
the All Black backline is always ~ to figure in a public bar conversation, where 
the line should be drawn between the two freedoms is a problem that has occupied 
political and legal thinking as much as, if not more than, any other. Agreement, however, 
has been extremely hard to come by - a situation that has much in common with that bar 
room debate. 
A complicating factor has always been the rights of minorities. Where should their 
collective right to reputation, and by extension self-determination, fit into this scheme? 
Such a question is further complicated when the speech that attacks a minority's rights 
comes from a member, or group, of the society's majority. Does the majority then, by 
virtue of its preferential position in society, owe the minority the benefit of special 
protection, necessitating further inroads into the right of free speech when it conflicts with 
minority rights than would normally be necessary? 
This essay will examine these questions in terms of the honest opinion defence in the 
Defamation Act 1992, which replaced the common law defence of fair comment. 
Specifically, it will focus on the requirement of the defence that the opinion be "genuine", 
and on the possible impact of New Zealand's position as a multicultural society on that 
requirement. To do this, it will discuss the applicability of common law to the defence, 
that of other sections of the Act, and requirements of the right of freedom of expression 
and minority rights themselves. It concludes that if contemporary New Zealand social 
values are not considered when publishing an opinion, that opinion cannot legitimately be 
termed "genuine". 
L INTRODUCTION - THE A WA CASE 
On a chilly winter's morning on 7 August, 1991, New Zealand lost one of its most beloved ~---~ 
entertainers. Billy T James, aged 42, died at Greenlane Hospital in Auckland of heart 
failure, not two years after having received a heart transplant. His death provoked a 
national outpouring of grief, appropriate to an entertainer of his stature - unfortunately, it 
also marked the beginning of a protracted legal dispute, which was not ended until some 
six years after he died. The accompanying facts are as found by the High Court. 
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In accordance with t wishes, Lynn James had intended to conduct a private funeral 
service, followed by one open to the public, after which she would 
bury her husband on 
Taupiri mountain. Maori custom, however, dictates that the
 deceased's whanau 
determines the burial arrangements, and in this case the subtribe fro
m Billy T's mother's 
side insisted that the services could not take place until his body 
had lain on a marae. 
Subsequently William Awa, chief kaumatua of the subtribe, went wi
th more than a dozen 
men to Billy T's Mu ·wai home to collect the body. After he wa
s asked to leave the 
property, he forcibly entered the house with his group and against Mr
s James' wishes took 
the body back to Turangawaewae marae. 
In an article written about the public funeral, the Sunday News, 
reacting to public 
sympathy for Mrs James, referred to Awa as "body-snatching U
ncle Bill". Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Awa took exception to this description and sued the 
paper for defamation. 
Because the offending article was published in 1991, a year before in
troduction of the new 
Act, the proceeding took place under the cµi~__s_of the Defamatio
n Act 1954, and the 
common law fair comment defence. The High Court, 
1 and subsequently the Court of 
Appeal,2 while agreeing that what the paper had written was defa
matory, held that the 
defence had been successfully made out. The rationale was that whi
le the court accepted 
that Awa was acting in accordance with custom, the question for
 the purposes of the 
defence was whether he was "morally blameworthy"
3 in taking Billy T's body without his 
widow's permission. In the end it was decided that this opinion was 
not only possible, but 
was in fact held by a significant proportion of the general public, a
nd the Sunday News 
was therefore entitled to print it. 
A. Fair comment 
The rationale behind the defence of fair comment is simple - it is to
 safeguard the vitally 
important right of freedom of expression, and ensure that inroads i
nto that right are not 
any more than is necessary. As Diplock J put it,
4 
1A wa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 701 (HC). (A
wa (HC)] 
2Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590 (CA). (A
wa (CA)] 
3 Awa (CA), above n 2, 595 per Blanchard J for the majority. 
4Sillcin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743, 747 (QBD
) per Diplock J. [Si/kin] 
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the basis of our public life is that the crank, the enthusiast, may say
 what he honestly 
thinks just as much as the reasonable man or woman who sits on a jury
. 
Notwithstanding such sentiments, the fair comment defence still re
quired the defendant to 
jump through several hoops in order to successfully claim it, 
and perhaps the most 
important of those hoops was the requirement that the opinion 
be fair. However, as 
Diplock J's views would indicate, this does not mean fair in the sen
se of being balanced or 
moderate. Although the law was less than clear on this point, the 
requirement of fairness 
appeared to be satisfied if the opinion was honest, and for this there
 were two tests. 
The first test was an objective one - could a fair-minded person
, however obstinate or 
prejudiced, be capable of holding the opinion?
5 For the purposes of this test it was 
unnecessary to show that the opinion was actually held by the defe
ndant - all that was 
required was that the defendant demonstrate that the opinion
 could be held by a 
fair-minded person. Thus, because honesty was being judged obje
ctively, the fact-finding 
tribunal was required to examine more than merely whether t
he published comment 
accurately reflected the defendant's true opinion. 
To illustrate, a subjective appraisal of honesty would require exa
mination of the factors 
that go to that person's state of mind, that is, the defendant's mo
tives for publishing the 
opinion. Judging a person's honesty objectively, however, necess
itates scrutiny of what 
the defendant actually said, and this requires a particular standard
 to serve as a basis of 
comparison. And despite judicial reluctance to use as that standard
 the reasonable person 
test, it seems difficult to judge honesty objectively any other way t
han asking whether the 
opinion was reasonable enough to be held by the honest, or fair-m
inded person. Exactly 
how far the honest opinion of the fair-minded person differs from
 that of the reasonable 
person is discussed later in the essay. 
The second, subjective test required the plaintiff to show malice o
n the defendant's part, 
or in other words that the defendant was predominantly motiv
ated in publishing the 
opinion by spite or ill will towards the plaintiff, or otherwise took
 improper advantage of 
the occasion.6 If the plaintiff could show this, the defence was def
eated.7 In this regard, 
5Silldn , above n 4, 749 per Diplock J. 
6Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135, 149-151 (HL). [Horrocks v Lowe] 
7Telnikojf v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343 (HL). However, the comm
on law was also confused on this 
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the fact that the defendant did not believe in the truth
 of the opm1on was usually 
conclusive evidence that the opinion was not honestly he
ld. 8 Here it was important that 
the defendant actually held the opinion, but the question o
nly arose if malice was pleaded. 
In the case of Awa, malice was not pleaded, so the subjec
tive test was not required. The 
objective test, whether the opinion could be honestly he
ld by a fair-minded person, was 
held by Blanchard J for the Court of Appeal to be satisfi
ed because it was apparent that 
many people did hold it. However, it should be noted tha
t the comment criticised only the 
actions of William Awa, and not Maori custom or protoc
ol itself Had the comment done 
so, Thomas J in partial dissent believed that the deci
sion may have been different. 
9 
Blanchard J, for his part, disagreed, stating that "[ o ]
ne race is entitled to comment 
adversely and even narrow-mindedly on another save as
 prohibited by statute".
10 It was 
these obiter comments of Blanchard J that were the genesi
s of this essay. 
lL HONEST OPINION 
For~' the statutory requirements of the h
onest op1ruon defence are the t><. 
following: 11 
In any proceedings for defamation in respect of matte
r that includes or consists of an 
expression of opinion, a defence of honest opinion by a de
fendant who is the author of 
the matter containing the opinion shall fail unless the d
efendant proves that the opinion 
e>..l)ressed was the defendant ' s genuine opinion. 
Like fair comment, this defence can only apply in two sit
uations. Firstly, the matter must 
already have been deemed defamatory, and for this it mu
st defame an individual. Group 
defamation actions are not available, except as provide
d by section 61 of the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (which will be discussed later in the essay
). Secondly, the matter must be 
an expression of opinion - printed facts alone regarding 
Maori custom or culture are not 
covered by this defence. If the facts are true, the approp
riate defence is truth, not honest 
point; see Cherneskey v Armadale Publishers Ltd et al (19
78) 90 DLR (3d) 321, 330 (SCC) per Ritchie J, 
where the view is espoused that it is for the defendant to
 prove that malice was not present. 
8Halsbury 's Laws of England (4 ed, reissue, Butterworths,
 London, 1997) vol 28, Defences, para 149, 78. 
9 Awa (CA), above n 2, 597 per Thomas J, dissenting. 
10Awa (CA), above n 2, 595 per Blanchard J for the majorit
y. 
11 Defamation Act 1992, s 10( I). 
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op1ruon. The purpose of this essay is merely to explo
re whether Blanchard J's comments 
are correct, if applied to honest opinion - could an expr
essed opinion that has already been 
found defamatory of an individual attract the def
ence if made in conjunction with 
narrow-minded, intolerant, or insensitive racial critic
ism? For this purpose, it will be 
necessary to examine exactly what is meant by the
 word "genuine", and whether an 
opinion such as that described above could be conside
red a "genuine" one. 
III. THE MEANING OF "GENUINE" 
A. Reason for the change from "fair comment" to "
honest opinion" 
It is true that the rationale of the change in name of t
he defence, at least in the opinion of 
the Committee on Defamation that recommended the 
name change, was to clarify that the 
opinion need not be fair, at least in the popular 
sense. Apparently, the name "fair 
comment" was confusing laypeople, who thought that
 this meant that the comment had to 
be reasonable, or balanced, or that they had to agree 
with it. This was not the case, said 
the committee - the only requirement was that the
 opinion was honestly held by its 
maker. 12 
What must be noted, however, is that nowhere in sec
tion 10 of the Defamation Act 1992 
is the word "honest" used. Instead, what is required is
 that the opinion be "genuine". The 
immediate question is what does "genuine" mean - is i
t synonymous with "honest"? If so, 
the objective and subjective tests at common law 
have been replaced with a purely 
subjective test, 13 and the fact that racist comments are
 made at the same time is irrelevant, 
as long as the opinion is an accurate reflection of wh
at the defendant actually believed at 
the time the comment was made Under this inter
pretation of the defence of honest 
opinion, Blanchard J' s comments would be correct. 
However, it must be assumed that Parliament does n
ot use words that do not accurately 
convey its intention. For example, if Parliament mean
t simply that the opinion need only 
be honest, then it must be concluded that the word "h
onest" would have been used. The 
12Recommendations on the Law on Defamation: Repo
rt of the Committee on Defamation (December 
1977) 37 [Defamation Committee] . 
13Bill Atkin "Defamation" in Hodge, Atkin, McLay an
d Pardy Torts in New Zealand: cases and materials 
(2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 610
. 
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use of the word "genuine" would have been unnecessary. The obv
ious conclusion is that 
it must either add, or take away, something from the meaning of"ho
nest". The remainder 
of the essay is an attempt to discover exactly what that is. 
B. Common Law 
One way to do this is to return to the rules laid down at common
 law. This is possible 
because it is generally accepted that the Defamation Act is not 
a code, and was not 
intended to be the be-all and end-all of defamation law, but mere
ly to clarify what was 
becoming an extremely confusing legal area_ 14 
One thing it may be argued that "genuine" adds under honest opini
on is an objective test, 
much like the one under common law fair comment. If commentator
s, including Geoffrey 
Palmer, the Minister that introduced the Defamation Act 1992, are
 correct in saying that 
the change of name of the defence was only to clarify existing law, 
that the requirement is 
one of honesty and not fairness, then there appears to be no reason
 why a subjective test 
should be the only one. After all, honesty can be tested ob
jectively as much as 
subjectively. 
In this way, the question might be can an honest person
15 hold an opinion that involves 
insensitive racial comment? In Turner v Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Pic
tures, Ltd16, Lord 
Porter opined that the word "fair" in relation to fair comment shou
ld be replaced with the 
word "honest", so that the requirement of honesty is not c
onfused with one of 
reasonableness. Similarly, courts have, in the past, held that 
the standard used in 
determining whether an opinion could be held by a fair-minded pe
rson should not be the 
one used in the "reasonable person test". 
The differences between a fair-minded person and a reasonable pe
rson are made clear in 
Si/kin. A fair-minded person, according to Diplock J, can include one
 that is prejudiced, 
14Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 34 per Elias J (HC); (10 Nove
mber 1997) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA 52/97) [Lange v Atkinson]; also see Judith Fergusson "H
onest Opinion and Public Interest" 
P998] NZLJ 14. · 
5It is submitted that providing the reader bears in mind that the test is on
e of honesty and not fairness, 
the phrase "fair-minded person" can be used interchangeably with
 the term "honest person" for the 
rtµpOses of the objective test. 
6Turner v Metro-Go/dwin-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1950) l All ER 449. [Tu
rner] 
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or obstinate - and in like fashion, in describing the types of view
s that the fair-minded 
person might hold, other courts have used the words "exaggerate
d", 17 "violent", 18 and 
even ''wrong". 19 A reasonable person, of course, would not hold 
these types of views -
such a person would be expected to be, at least to a degree, re
spectful, tolerant, and 
considerate of others. Obviously, a fair-minded person may not be. 
But this, it is submitted, does not mean that such a person wo
uld hold racist views. 
Rather, such views have no redeeming value, and it is unlikely tha
t this is how the word 
"prejudiced" in Si/kin is meant to be interpreted. "Prejudiced", it is arg
ued, should be 
given its dictionary definition of "a preconceived opinion", or a ''b
ias or partiality". 20 A 
racist opinion, or one motivated by racist beliefs, on the other hand
, goes beyond that. A 
fair-minded person need not be as impartial and tolerant as the h
ypothetical reasonable 
person, but neither may such a person be a racist. A racially
 insensitive comment, 
therefore, should not be considered an "honest" one. 
This is particularly so, history would indicate, in New Zealand. If "
genuine" adds an 
objective element, then surely what must also be taken into acco
unt are the values of 
contemporary New Zealand society. This must be true even of the
 ''fair-minded person", 
who, while not as tolerant as the "reasonable person", cannot fail to
 be positively affected 
by community values and freedoms. As Thomas J, dissenting in the
 Court of Appeal, said 
inAwa: 21 
New Zealand is a nation of two peoples. Each has its own cultu
re and language. 
History, and the population imbalance in this country, mean that the E
uropean culture is 
the dominant culture and the Maori culture and language is in j
eopardy of being 
engulfed. Problems and tensions . . . inevitably exist. Yet. the two
 peoples . . . must 
necessarily strive to work together in common accord. 
These sentiments are not uncommon in New Zealand courts, an
d were echoed most 
notably by Cooke P during the New Zealand Maori Council cases
 in the late 1980s and 
17Turner, above n 16, 461 per Lord Porter; Cornwall v Myskow [1987] 2 
All ER 504, 512 (CA). 
18Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275, 283 (CA) per Bowen LJ. [Meri
vale] 
19Merivale , above n 18, 283; Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 
157, 170 (CA) per Lord Denning 
MR. 
20The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990).
 
21Awa (CA) above n 2, 598, per Thomas J. 
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early 1990s. In one particular case he held that 
the Treaty of Waitangi "signified a 
partnership"22 between the Pakeha and Maori, in wh
ich each race had to act towards the 
other reasonably, fairly, and with ''utmost good faith"
. 23 While the case was heard in the 
context of a statute (the State-owned Enterprises Act
 1986) that specifically provided that 
nothing in the Act could allow the Government to ac
t inconsistently with the Treaty, it is 
submitted that these principles are fundamental to 
New Zealand society, and are thus 
worthy of attention, if appropriate, when considerin
g whether a comment can attract a 
defence to a defamation lawsuit. 
Therefore, it is submitted, a comment that involve
s racial slurs cannot be "genuine", 
because, firstly, such a comment is not fair-minded, a
nd secondly it is at odds with what is 
desirable in a modem New Zealand society. Thomas
 J felt that we should not be looking 
to the law for guidance on what is morally right 
to publish, but in the area of race ( 
relations, given the precarious position of Maori and
 other minorities in this country, it 
seems right that the dominant culture should pro
vide as much legal protection as 
practicable. 
It is this simple point which, with respect, Blanchard 
J ly fails to address in his .iy 
~
majority opinion. By neglecting to give proper weig
ht to the interpretation of "genuine" 
argued for in this essay, he also ignores the comm
ents made by Cooke P in the New 
Zealand Maori Council cases, and thus the spirit em
bodied in the Treaty of Waitangi (a 
treaty which binds the Crown, at least at internati
onal law). Unfortunately, with the 
notable exception of Thomas J, the rest of the Court
 of Appeal were, again with respect, 
content to ignore it as well. 
C Human Rights Act 
It may be argued that the Human Rights Act 1993 was
 introduced primarily to provide 
special protection to minorities, including in the area 
of freedom of expression. That Act 
makes it an offence for anyone to2
4 
22 New Zealand Maori Counci I v A-G [ 1987) 1 NZLR 641, 663 (C
A). [New Zealand Maori Counci I] 
23 New Zealand Maori Council, above n 22, 664. 
24Human Rights Act 1993, s 6l(l)(a). 
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publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abus
ive or insulting ... being 
matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into
 contempt any group of 
persons in or who may be corning to New Zealand on the bas
is of the colour, race, or 
ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
If the racial slur that accompanies a comment defamatory of 
an individual satisfies this 
test, then it seems inconsistent to hold that the same slur can
 constitute a defence to a 
defamation action. Further, the way in which this section has be
en interpreted may mean 
that it is not adequate to cover all hurtful and intolerant comme
nts that may be directed at 
minorities by members of the majority. For example, the mean
ing of "insulting" has been 
determined seemingly on what the common sense position is
 - the ''views of the very 
sensitive are not an appropriate measure of whether something 
is insulting",25 but instead, 
the correct test is the "reasonable person" test. 
26 Common law also tells us that the 
question of whether hostility will be excited or contempt will b
e generated is determined 
"on the reaction of New Zealanders who are less perceptive o
r sensitive on racial issues 
than others". 27 
Secondly, the section itself is narrower in focus than its prede
cessor, section 9A of the 
Race Relations Act 1971. Section 61 of the Human Rights Act 
1993 only requires that the 
threatening, abusive or insulting matter be likely to excite hos
tility against or bring into 
contempt any group of persons on the basis of, inter alia, race.
 Section 9A, on the other 
hand, applied if such words were likely to excite ill-will against
 the group, or bring it into 
ridicule - both of which are seemingly less stringent tests than t
hose under section 61 . In 
other words, statements that are likely to merely excite ill-w
ill or bring a group into 
ridicule are no longer sufficient to attract the Human Rights 
Act, unless they also go 
further, and are likely to excite hostility against or bring the g
roup into contempt. This 
may result in greater protection for free speech, but is hardly 
consistent with Cooke P's 
desire for good faith between Pakeha and Maori . 
Thus there are conceivably statements that may not contravene 
the Human Rights Act, yet 
are not conducive to the goal of harmonious race relations.
 28 However, surely if a 
25Skelton v Sunday Star-Times [1995-1995] 1 NZCLD 361 (CRT)
. 
26 Proceedings Commissioner v Archer [ 1995-96] 1 NZCLD 351 (
CRT). (Archer] 
27 Archer, above n 26. 
28This may particularly be the case if the comment is made in ter
ms of satire. For example, if the 
comment in Awa included the opinion that Maori culture was a
 "body-snatching" one, or was "ghoulish" 
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country denounces racism it should denounc
e all racist speech, not just that offensive to 
the reasonable person, especially when you 
consider that the respective positions of the
 
two races mean that the reasonable person w
ill no doubt be Pakeha. For this reason, it 
seems that there is a good argument that the
 "genuine" requirement in honest opinion be 
interpreted expansively, to ensure that racist s
peech is caught by the law. 
D. Malice 
A further reason why it may be argued that 
such comments should not be included in a 
definition of "genuine" can be found in the 
common law rules regarding the subjective 
concept of malice. While it is true that s
ection 10(3) of the Defamation Act 1992 
specifically excludes from the honest opinion 
defence the application of malice it has been 
claimed that29 
matters which may be relied on to cast doubt o
n the genuineness of the defendant's 
opinion will be much the same as those that c
ould be relied on at common law to 
establish malice, or to demonstrate that the op
inion was not one which an honest person 
could hold. 
One of the examples that John Burrows 
gives of evidence casting doubt on the 
genuineness of an opinion is if its dissemin
ation is inspired by an ulterior motive, or 
exceptionally strong language is used in the 
way the opinion is phrased. 30 It might be 
argued that the use of racist language in 
an opinion is itself an ulterior motive for 
publishing it, especially as the opinion must 
be directed at an individual in order to be 
deemed defamatory. The opinion may well
 be seen as an opportunity for airing racist 
ideas, rather than allowing someone to air ge
nuinely held views, which after all is a right 
fundamental to a free and democratic society.
 
Similarly, there is no reason why the use of
 racist language may not cast doubt on the 
genuineness of an opinion in the same way in
vective did at common Jaw, as discussed in 
for requiring a dead body to lie on a marae 
for three days, but is said in a semi-joking m
anner, or as 
sarcasm, it is conceivable it would not pass th
e reasonable person test of "insulting". Ditto
 racist jokes, 
and/or innuendo. 
29John Burrows "Defamation" in Stephen Todd
 (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed,
 Brookers 
Ltd, Wellington, 1997) 902 ["Defamation"]. 
30"Defamation", above n 29, 903. 
Mike Freedman 
12 
Minorities and Honest Opinion 
the case of Cornwall v Myskow.
31 The rationale behind making invective evidence of 
malice was that such language often exposed an ulte
rior motive in the comment - that of 
attacking the plaintiff personally, perhaps to settle a
 private resentment, or to injure the 
plaintiff - which in tum cast doubt on the subjectiv
e honesty of the defendant's belief 
Strong language was permitted, as was "ironical, bitt
er or even extravagant language". 
32 
However, if the criticism was so strong that it went b
eyond legitimate criticism, it became 
invective, and evidence that the comment did not re
flect the defendant's true view, and 
certainly not a fair-minded person's view. Thus, b
ecause the comment failed both the 
objective and subjective tests for honesty under fair c
omment, it could not be covered by 
that defence. 
In the same way, racist language could be evidenc
e that the defendant did not really 
believe what was said. In Pearce v Hailstone, 
33 Legoe J suggested that the position in 
Australia was correctly stated by the English Court o
f Appeal in Gwynne v Stope, a case 
that was reported only in the Times newspaper ( 4 May 
1928). That case was not referred 
to in Horrocks v Lowe,
34 but was relied on by Gatley on Libel and Slander f
or the 
proposition that35 
malice could be found even where a person honestly
 believed what he said to be true if 
through anger or gross and unreasoning prejudice he
 has allowed his mind to get in such 
a state, to become so obsessed, as to cast reckless as
persions on other people which but 
for such state of mind he could not have honestly bel
ieved to be true. 
The term ''unreasoning prejudice" was first judicially
 used in the judgment of Lord Esher 
MR in Royal Aquarium v Parkinson, 36 and might 
very easily apply to a comment 
motivated by racism. After all, but for a racist state
 of mind the defendant could not be 
said to actually believe such a comment. In other
 words, the racist beliefs cloud the 
judgment of the defendant, and result in aspersions on
 other people being made recklessly, 
and maliciously. On an objective test, such a resu
lt of unreasoning prejudice would 
31 (1987] 2 All ER 504 (CA); also see Gardiner vJohn
 Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 
~SC) [Gardiner], and Newbury v Triad Magazine Ltd
 (1921) SR (NSW) 189 (SC). 
2Gardiner, above n 31 , 174. 
33(1992) 58 SASR 240 (SC) per Legoe J. 
34Horrocks v Lowe, above n 6. 
3\9 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1998, para 16.1
6) 437. 
36Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden So
ciety v Parkinson (1892) 1 QB 431 , 444. 
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prevent an opinion from being deemed "genuine", because, due to 
its inconsistency with 
the promotion of community values, that opinion could not po
ssibly be held by a 
fair-minded person. However, even when "genuine" is interpreted su
bjectively, an opinion 
motivated by unreasoning prejudice could, given that it may be 
said to be expressed 
recklessly, lead a court to find that the defendant was subjectively
 dishonest - in other 
words, that the defendant did not believe what was said. 
37 Thus, while malice is 
specifically removed from honest opinion, it is submitted that th
ese are the types of 
situations that could cast doubt on the genuineness of an opinion. 
E. Other sections of the Defamation Act 
It is also helpful in interpreting the word "genuine" to examine 
other sections of the 
Defamation Act. For example, section 19(1) provides that the 
defence of qualified 
privilege is defeated if the plaintiff can show that
38 
in publishing the matter that is the subject of the proceeding
s, the defendant was 
predominantly motivated by ill will towards the plaintiff, or othe
rwise took improper 
advantage of the occasion of publication. 
This is essentially the old common law definition of malice, but sect
ion 19(2) specifically 
provides that malice shall not defeat qualified privilege. Thus, subs
ection ( 1) appears to 
redefine malice insofar as it applies to qualified privilege, and raises 
the crucial question -
for the purposes of defeating a claim of honest opinion, must ther
e be something other 
than ill will or improper advantage? Or, alternatively, has Parliament 
left it up to the courts 
to determine what is "genuine", when faced with the kinds of situati
ons that amounted to 
malice at common law? It may be asked what possible policy reas
ons there could be in 
excluding ill will and improper advantage from the factors that wou
ld render unavailable 
an honest opinion defence, if they are available for a qualified privile
ge defence. It would 
allow defendants to claim the defence of honest opinion even if the
 comment was made, 
37No doubt a subjective test on this basis would be more stringe
nt and difficult to satisfy than the 
objective one, given that people are capable of subjectively hold
ing racist opinions, and the comment 
would have to be considerably more objectionable to the fact-findi
ng tribunal before it would rule that the 
defendant was subjectively dishonest. Nevertheless, it is still con
ceivable that a comment could fail the 
test of "genuine", even if only a subjective test applied. 
3 8 Section 19(1) Defamation Act 1992. 
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for example, to deliberately hurt the plaintiff, rathe
r than because it was what the 
defendant truly believed. Can it really be said that this i
s what Parliament intended? 
It seems that Parliament has been deliberately obscure
 in what exactly constitutes malice 
for the purposes of section 10(3). The 1977 
Defamation Committee's report 
recommended that the word "malice" not be used at al
l in the Act, as it felt the term was 
confusing and unnecessary, especially for lay people an
d therefore, presumably, jurors. 
39 
However, Parliament has deliberately chosen to includ
e the word, and it seems left it to 
the courts to determine whether situations of a kind
 that were deemed malicious at 
common law could similarly prevent an opinion formed
 in these circumstances from being 
"genuine". Logic would appear to suggest that they sho
uld be. 
Section 12 reinforces this contention. This section was inten
ded to do away with the rule 
in Campbell v Spottiswoode,
40 which is authority for the proposition that if base o
r 
improper motives are alleged in the opinion, at commo
n law this meant a more objective 
test was applied; not only did the opinion need to be h
onest, but the fact-finding tribunal 
also had to be satisfied that it was well founded . In Aw
a, this test appeared to be used 
even though no base or improper motives were allege
d - nevertheless, a more objective 
fair-minded person test was used. Section 12 makes it clea
r that there is only one test -
that the opinion be "genuine". 
However, the word "genuine" is still not defined - if th
e above arguments are correct, an 
objective test may apply whether base or improper moti
ves are alleged or not. Section 12 
does not say that the only test that can be applied is sub
jective - it merely says that the test 
that is used must be the same as the one that is applied
 if no such motives are alleged. It 
seems possible, if not likely, that an opinion that includ
es those sorts of motives, like one 
that contains racist language, could not be seen as "genu
ine". 
F. Purpose of the defence 
The very purpose of honest op1ruon would seem t
o further indicate that the word 
"genuine" should be interpreted to exclude the poss
ibility of racist comments being 
deemed permissible under the defence. In examining the
 defence of fair comment, but 
39Defamation Committee above n 12, 64. 
40campbel/ v Spottiswoode (1863) 3 B & S 769. 776-777 p
er Cockburn CJ. 
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with statements that could very easily be applied to honest 
opinion, Hammond J in the 
High Court judgment of Awa outlined the purpose as being
41 
[to encourage] those attempting to convey their findings about
 public matters to present 
to their readers or their hearers .. . a reasonable opportunity to 
discuss more intelligently 
the subject matter upon which they are writing or speaking. 
The problem with insensitive racial commentary is that it sim
ply does not allow recipients 
of the opinion with any sort of opportunity to discuss in an 
intelligent manner its subject 
matter. Instead, such comment plays on the emotion of the re
ader and does not allow any 
room for the application of logic or common sense. In Awa,
 it was argued by defence 
counsel that a comment motivated by Maori custom co
uld not be spoken about 
intelligently if said custom is not fairly examined or respected.
 This argument was rejected 
out of hand by Blanchard J, who believed that each race d
eserved the right to publicly ) 
make narrow-minded and harsh observations of the practices 
of another, unless prevented 
by the Human Rights Act. He ignored the fact that the respec
tive positions of the races in ) 
this country are far from equal, and contented himself in striki
ng a blow for free speech. 
However, Thomas J rejected counsel's submissions not becau
se he believed it was vital in 
a democracy that different races be permitted to take pot-sho
ts at each other, but because 
the comment was not itself directed at Maori custom. This 
suggests that if it had been, 
Thomas J may well have come to a different conclusion. 
This would seem to be the 
correct approach, because if a comment criticises Maori custo
m it should be the result of a 
balanced and reasonable examination of that custom. Other
wise, the comment is made 
without a fair appraisal of the facts, which in turn makes it i
mpossible for the readers of 
the comment to discuss intelligently any matter connected wit
h it. 
It should perhaps be pointed out at this point that the writer 
is not arguing that fair, well 
thought out and justified criticism of Maori culture, or the cu
lture of any minority for that 
matter, should be excluded from an honest opinion defence. 
Nor is it being argued that 
publishers should be prevented from printing facts about the c
ulture. However, Blanchard 
Jin Awa stated that publishers should be able to state narrow-m
inded and harsh opinions, 
except if prevented by statute, and as long as it is the honest o
pinion of the publisher this is 
41A wa (HC), above n 1, 706 per Hammond J. 
Mike Freedman 
16 
Minorities and Honest Opinion 
perfectly acceptable. However, it is seriously questionable whether such
 op1ruons are 
compatible with the values of a contemporary New Zealand society, or even
 the words of 
the Act itself, and certainly with the purpose of the defence. 
This is especially true when the comment is made in the mainstream media
. To achieve 
the goals above, it may be said that it is less important for the average person
 on the street 
that the test for genuineness be so applied. But for a mass medium that ha
s the potential 
to influence millions of people it may be argued that it has a greater respo
nsibility to be 
fair and reasonable in its published perceptions on another culture before su
ch comments 
may be deemed "genuine". After all, as most defamation actions now involv
e the media 
against an individual then perhaps the law of defamation should be adapted t
o incorporate 
that phenomenon. 42 
G. Conclusion on "genuine" 
In sum, the word "genuine" should be given an expansive interpretation. If
 a comment is 
directed at ( and is defamatory of) an individual, and includes at the same ti
me insensitive 
or intolerant racial commentary, then it should not be permitted to attrac
t the defence 
under section 10, even if the comment does not breach the Human Rights A
ct. The word 
should also be interpreted so that the comment may be examined in terms o
f the values of 
contemporary New Zealand society. If it runs counter to those values, it sur
ely cannot be 
described as "genuine". 
If it is true, however, that this approach takes liberties with the express w
ording of the 
statute, or that of the judgments that have interpreted the defence of fair c
omment, then 
the writer's response is simply to criticise the law as being too cons
ervative, and 
insufficiently flexible to take account of the changed social climate that has r
esulted in the 
increased prevalence of racial hatred. Further, if such comments are accepta
ble under the 
honest opinion defence, then this appears to be seriously at odds with the bas
ic purpose of 
42Interestingly, this view finds a supporter in Tipping J, who, in delivering the 
minority Court of Appeal 
judgment in Lange v Atkinson (above n 14), considered a requirement of r
easonableness for the news 
media in connection with the defence of qualified privilege, no doubt being in
fluenced by the potential of 
the media to misuse the occasion. Similarly, his comments that the defence 
of qualified privilege could 
embrace aspects of reasonableness support the above arguments regardin
g the relationship of the 
fair-minded person and racist comments, because there seems to be no reason 
why such comments should 
not also apply to honest opinion. 
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not only the defence, but indeed the fundamental right of freedo
m of expression that 
underlies it . 
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
A. Diametrically opposed positions 
The fundamental nature of the right to freedom of expression is not,
 and has never been, in 
doubt. It is enshrined in domestic
43 and international law,44 and forms the foundation of 
modem democratic society. According to the "libertarian" ideol
ogy,45 limits are only 
thought acceptable if unrestrained speech would cause immediate p
eril to society. This is 
what is known, in civil liberty circles, as the "clear and present
 danger" test - often 
formulated in terms of whether allowing the speech is comparab
le to falsely shouting 
"fire!" in a crowded cinema. 
On the other hand, the "egalitarian ideological position"
46 sees things somewhat 
differently. This position gives primacy to the ideals of amicable
 race relations, equal 
rights, and individual and collective dignity (including the right 
to self-determination). 
Further, it accepts the concept of (reasonable) limitations on th
e right of freedom of 
expression if it is necessary to protect these rights. This reasoning
 is echoed in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which, while affirming the right of
 freedom of expression 
in section 14, allows reasonable limitations to those rights by virtue
 of section 5. In sum, 
while the two positions appear to agree that hate propaganda
, and insensitive and 
intolerant racial criticism made from a position of perceived racial 
superiority must come 
under this category, is of no benefit to society, it is the egalitarian po
sition that would take 
steps to prohibit it. 
43New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
44Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rig
hts (to which New Zealand is a 
party); article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection o
f Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
45Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Exp
ression" (1996) 8 AULR 185, 189 
['Hate Speech"]. 
6"Hate Speech", above n 45, 190. 
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B. Proponents of unrestricted freedom of expression 
One of the arguments made by such people is that it is vital to
 the successful running of 
democratic government that freedom of expression be as unre
stricted as possible. It is 
said that one of the fundamental characters of a democracy is t
hat citizens are entitled to 
have a say in how it works. Therefore, it is crucial that peopl
e be able to express ideas 
and opinions regarding the government's performance, or lack 
thereof They should also 
have access to all information so that they can make a considere
d decision in, for example, 
how to vote in a general election. 
This is related to the "market-place of ideas" argument - tha
t it is only by hearing all 
viewpoints that intelligent decision making is possible, and truth
 can be discovered. Thus, 
real gains are achieved for the community that would 
not be possible without 
untrammelled freedom of expression. 
4 7 The conclusion is that if as much speech as 
possible is not allowed, even that of doubtful value to the proces
s, society is on a "slippery 
slope";48 the idea that once speech of doubtful legitimacy to the
 "market-place of ideas" is 
restricted, there is little or nothing to stop speech of crucial im
portance eventually being 
similarly inhibited . 
Civil libertarians also claim that free speech is vital for a person'
s development in the areas 
of self-expression and self-fulfilment.
49 Sadurski describes this view as proposing that in 
expressing ourselves to others we reveal our very identity, and
 by receiving feedback on 
this expression we change not only the way we see ourselves
, but also how others see 
us. 50 The libertarian view is that this is impossible if we are not 
permitted to communicate 
with others in an open and frank manner. 
Thus, because of its capacity to assist in the proper running o
f democratic government, 
especially via the attainment of truth through the "marketplace
 of ideas" theory, and the 
opportunity for the development of self-expression and se
lf-fulfilment, freedom of 
4 7Kathleen Mahoney "Hate Vilification Legislation and Freedom
 of Information: Where is the Balance?" 
(1994) l AJHR. <http://www.austlii.edu.au/ahric/ajhr/ajhr 112
 lmahoney.html> (last modified 15 
December 1996). ["Hate Vilification"]. 
48"Hate Vilification", above n 47. 
49Wojciech Sadurski "Offending with Impunity: Racial Vilifica
tion and Freedom of Speech" (1992) 14 
S0d LR 163 ["Offending"]. 5 "Offending", above n 49, 175. 
Mike Freedman 
19 
Minorities and Honest Opinion 
expression is seen by libertarians as having an "intrinsic value, not just as a means to
 an 
end, but as an end in itself'.51 How, civil libertarians ask, could society even think
 of 
limiting something so precious? 
A third argument for the libertarian position follows on from the above two - simply, 
that 
the fact that an intolerant vocal minority might or do take offence to the comment is n
ot a 
justification for prohibiting it. Indeed, it has even been said that the fact the matte
r is 
offensive is all the more reason for protecting it. 
52 For civil libertarians, one of the great 
features of a democracy is the ability of its citizens to float unattractive ideas, and prom
ote 
discussion and debate. They fear that if such ideas are inhibited just because certain
 
members of society do not like them, the system breaks down and a police state is not
 far 
away. 
It is also said that by restricting and punishing such speech what is really happening is that 
it is being forced underground where it is more likely to survive and flourish. Prosecut
ion 
is likely to give these people a stage from which they can espouse their hatred, and 
any 
legal response may result in their being martyred. It is much better, civil libertarians say, 
to expose such speech to the cold light of day and the force of public opinion, whic
h is 
more likely to stop it in its tracks than any amount of government legislation will do
. It 
would also give citizens the opportunity to decide for themselves what is true and wha
t is 
false, a right that every person on the face of the planet should have. 
Finally, it is more conducive to the right to require the audience of speech to avoid 
it if 
they find it offensive. This idea was described by Sadurski as the "heckler' s veto",
53 and 
is predicated on the idea that if we permitted the hearers of speech to determine w
hen 
limitations should be placed on it, we would be allowing such audiences to be '
<the 
ultimate judges of constitutional rights". 
54 However, liberals see the function of the law 
as preserving the rights of speakers against hostile listeners, not the other way around. 
51 "Hate Speech", above n 45, 191. 
52"0ffending", above n 49, 186. 
53"0ffending", above n 49, 181. 
54"0ffending", above n 49, 181. 
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C Critique of the libertarian rationale 
While there is certainly some validity in the position of civil libertarians, it begins to crack 
when applied to hate propaganda. There are, of course, no unlimited rights in society, and 
the right to freedom of expression, while fundamental, is no exception. For example, 
while section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms the free speech right, 
and would override any common law rule purporting to restrict it, the justified limitations 
rule in section 5 also must be considered, which must in tum take into account any 
conflicting rights - including the right of minorities to quietly enjoy their culture, and thus 
that of self-determination. 55 By virtue of section 28, this is true even if the conflicting 
right is not expressly laid down in the statute. What must be remembered is that the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act affirms rights - it does not create them. 
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes it clear that the 
right to freedom of expression carries with it "special duties and responsibilities". 
56 Thus, 
it may be restricted, but such restrictions must be prescribed by law and necessary, inter 
alia, to ensure the rights and reputations of others are respected. Therefore, one of the 
responsibilities that goes with the right of free speech is not to use that right to infringe the 
rights of others. 
To take the arguments of civil libertarians one by one, the belief that freedom of 
expression is essential to democratic government, and its related "marketplace of ideas" 
theory, is seriously flawed when applied to hate speech. If such speech works by attacking 
the rights and reputations of minorities who are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to 
fighting back, then it is difficult to see exactly how this assists democratic government. If 
anything, it undermines it, because it strikes at the heart of other fundamental freedoms 
that are necessary for it. 
Mahoney also points out that it relies on an "eighteenth century tone". 
57 Essential to it is 
the idea that governments pose a continual danger to the freedom of the populace - and 
55The right to self-determination is enshrined in articles 1 and 27 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(both of which New Zealand has ratified) . While this particular right is not included in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights, the right of minorities to enjoy their culture is (s 20). 
56lnternational Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, art 19(3). 
57"Hate Vilification", above n 47. 
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that as soon as they are given the chance, they will return to the manne
r of dictatorial 
governments of years past. This, Mahoney asserts, completely misinterpret
s the functions 
governments are required to perform. Governments must act as a voice 
for those who 
have none - to ensure that their ideas and opinions are also heard. Hate spe
ech, however, 
acts to deny minorities this voice, and is therefore the antithesis of a democr
atic society, as 
well as the desirable results of tolerance and racial harmony. 
The market place of ideas theory also assumes, argues Mahoney, that all p
arties have the 
same chance to have their ideas heard. But this opportunity, in a contemp
orary Western 
society, is controlled by the mass media. The "market place of ide
as" argument, 
conceived as it was in the nineteenth century, could not possibly have antici
pated the mass 
media explosion of the twentieth. The simple fact today is that as far as a lo
t of people are 
concerned, the truth is whatever the mass media say it is. And control of th
e mass media 
is of course exerted by those in power, and those with wealth and influ
ence. This is 
inevitably going to be the majority, which is yet another reason why the mi
nority must be 
afforded special protection. 
Secondly, the idea that freedom of expression should be untrammelle
d because it 
contributes to the self-expression and self-fulfilment of the citizen simila
rly encounters 
difficulties, especially when you consider, as Sadurski did, that self-fulfilm
ent must also 
determine the restrictions on the freedom. For example, beating 
someone to 
unconsciousness may be your preferred means of expressing yourself, but
 this does not 
mean that you are entitled to do it. Similarly58 
insulting racial minorities may be necessary for your sense of w
uestrained 
self-expression and self-fulfilment. But it must be subjected to the same lim
its that we 
accept, in a liberal society, with regard to any conduct, communicative or othe
rwise. 
It should also be pointed out that intolerant racial expression does not
 intensify self 
fulfilment, because its nature is one of hate and ignorance. This does not ma
ke someone a 
better person, and it certainly does not contribute to society. What it do
es do is make 
someone bitter and twisted, and far from being able to see rational truths. F
or this reason 
alone, a government has the right, and indeed the duty, to step in especially
 if in doing so 
58"0ffending", above n 49, 175. 
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it allows other members of a society, particularly of a minority, the ability
 to develop and 
grow, an opportunity that they simply will not have if hate speech is allow
ed to flourish in 
the community. 
The argument that government denunciation of such speech will merely s
erve to drive it 
underground is also flawed . Instead, what may well happen is t
hat community 
denunciation of such speech, working through the legal system, will sym
bolise society' s 
abhorrence of the speech. It would give minorities a method of redress w
hen faced with 
such attacks, and would prevent not only their exploitation but also that o
f the rest of the 
community, who are prevented from thinking rationally by such speech. 
59 
However, perhaps the best argument for the special treatment of minoritie
s is the reply to 
the civil libertarians' final argument - that this kind of expression merely ca
uses offence to 
the recipient, and mere offence should never be a justification for censorsh
ip. Once again, 
this argument shows the civil libertarians' penchant for completely misun
derstanding the 
fundamental nature of racism. By claiming that there is no real harm done
 by hate speech 
is to dismiss, and thus avoid confronting the real injury done to membe
rs of minorities 
facing such public ridicule. Sadurski describes the situation hypothetically:
60 
... since the day I heard the speech, my life has clearly been transfonned for
 the worse. 
Whenever I meet my neighbours, fellow workers, or salespersons in the sho
ps, I search 
for expressions of dislike or contempt in their eyes. When they are rude, I a
ttribute it to 
their hatred of Poles.6 1 When they are polite, I treat it as a sympto
m of their 
patronising attitude, or their protecting me from distress. They know that I a
m Polish. I 
know that they know. And they know that I know that they know. 
Sadurski hypothesises that civil libertarians often underestimate the hurt
fulness of hate 
speech on the psyche of the victim because they imagine how they would fe
el as a member 
of a dominant group if the same kind of speech was made by a minor
ity constituent. 
Obviously, on any issue the majority can shout down the minority, an
d pass laws to 
prevent or control their public dissidence. But as a member of a minority, 
particularly one 
59"Hate Speech", above n 45, 195. 
60"0ffending", above n 49, 186. 
61 Sadurski was describing the situation that confronts a Polish immigrant in the
 United States, but at least 
a similar situation must confront for instance a Maori on hearing such publi
c speech, and it may be even 
worse because of the Maori ' s status as natives - New Zealand is their homelan
d, after all. 
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who lived in this country years before the European majority ever knew that it even 
existed, such speech must be especially hurtful, and deserving of prohibition. Arguing that 
the victim of such speech should carry the burden of avoiding it, as the people of the 
village of Skokie were advised to do by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1978, 
62 
legitimises the speech, and trivialises those feelings of hurt and despair. 
The reader may argue that such speech, even if it does mentally harm its target, is just that 
- speech. It is, after all, not an act of violence, but just an expression of racist views. 
However, Gorden Allport, a social psychologist cited by Mahoney, argues that racist 
speech that physically hurts no-one is part of a process that eventually can lead to the type 
of genocide attempts seen by Adolf Hitler in the Second World War. There are, argues 
Allport, five stages - from the hateful expression itself, to the kind of "avoidance''6
3 
Sadurski wrote about, through racial discrimination, physical attack, and finally genocide. 
Each part of the chain depends on the one immediately before it. Hate speech is nothing 
to scoff at - left alone, it can do more damage than one man with a gun ever could. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the above arguments indicate, the balance between allowing full exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression, and placing limitations on it, is an extremely delicate one - and the 
task of reaching the correct balance is made considerably more difficult when the rights of 
minorities are thrown into the mix. It is not an easy task the state has, nor is it an enviable 
one. But it is one that must be attempted, and in the end it is the interests of society as a 
whole, rather than one of the parties to the particular dispute, that must be given effect to . 
It is well accepted, in an enlightened society, that racist speech has no inherent value. 
Thus, restricting it harms noone, least of all society. Allowing the majority of a society to 
ride roughshod over the rights of a minority, however, is harmful, not just because of the 
possibility of violent retribution, but because it changes a society somehow - it brings the 
society's commitment to freedom into question. This is the understanding behind the 
62The Village of Skokie v The Nationalist Socialist Party of America (1978) 373 NE (2d) 21 (S.Ct. Ill .), 
in which the defendant party had threatened to demonstrate on the streets wearing prominently displayed 
swastikas, in a town where approximately 40,500 of the town 's 70.000 people were Jewish (thousands of 
whom were either personally captive at a concentration camp in Germany in the Second World War, or 
had relatives who were). 
63"Hate Vilification", above n 47. 
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 
7 of which requires member states to 
undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures . . . with a view to combating 
prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding. 
tolerance, and friendship among nations and racial or ethical groups, as well as to 
propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. and this Convention. 
That, if for no other reason, is why the word "genuine" in section 10 of the Defamation 
Act 1992 should be judicially interpreted to ensure that racist speech is condemned by 
society, through its legal system. Further justification, if any were needed, is found in 
examining not just the position of the common law prior to the introduction of the Act, 
but also the Human Rights Act 1993, other sections of the Defamation Act 1992, the 
purpose of the honest opinion defence, and the fundamental right of freedom of expression 
itself 
A quote comes to mind, one that has been used so often that it surely no longer requires 
citation. It embodies the spirit of the freedom of expression right, and carries with it the 
message enshrined in this paper - that in ensuring that its citizens live in a free and 
democratic society, the state must never lose sight of the fact that fundamental rights, 
especially those involving expression, can often be implemented at the expense of the very 
people they are designed to protect. As a very wise man once said: "the price of freedom 
is eternal vigilance". 
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